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Aircraft: Cessna 180
Where: Seward, Alaska
Injuries: 1 fatal; 1 serious
Phase of Flight: Cruise Flight
On
January 2, 2006, about 1100 Alaska standard time, a wheel-equipped Cessna
180 airplane, N212RF, sustained substantial damage when it collided with
terrain during maneuvering flight, about 7 miles east of Seward, Alaska. The
airplane was being operated by the pilot as a visual flight rules (VFR)
personal cross-country flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident
occurred. The airline transport pilot received serious injuries, and the
sole passenger received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed the Quartz
Creek airstrip, Cooper Landing, Alaska, about 1030.
A
U.S. Coast Guard C-130 airplane from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, was
flying in the area of the accident, and received an emergency signal from
the accident airplane's emergency locator transmitter (ELT), about 1205. The
Coast Guard airplane located the accident airplane on the Godwin Glacier,
and relayed its location to the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in
Anchorage, Alaska. A helicopter from the Alaska, Air National Guard, 210th
Rescue Squadron, was dispatched to the scene, but was unable to reach the
site due to clouds obscuring the accident site. After aborting several
attempts to reach the site due to weather on the glacier, the helicopter
made it to the site about 2000.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on January 4, the Air National
Guard Para rescue technician who made initial contact with the pilot, said
the pilot told him he had been flying up the glacier, encountered a
downdraft, and was being pushed down. He said the pilot told him he turned
down slope to "escape" when the airplane contacted the glacier. The rescue
technician described the accident site as a snow-covered glacial slope of 10
degrees or less, about 4,100 feet in elevation, and noted that they were
able to land their helicopter on the slope. He said the airplane contacted
the glacier up slope from where it had come to rest, and that the landing
gear had separated from the airplane, and lay upslope from the main
wreckage.
During an interview with the NTSB IIC and an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector
on, the pilot said he departed Cooper Landing for a private airstrip he
frequents at Cape Junken, Alaska, which is typically a 30-minute flight. He
said his general routine is to fly over Seward, cross a saddle near the top
of the glacier at 4,500 feet above sea level, and proceed to Cape Junken. He
said he did not recall anything out of the ordinary, and said there were no
problems with the airplane or its engine. He said he does not have any
independent recollection of the accident.
During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on January 12, the
aircraft commander of the Coast Guard C-130 airplane that located the
wreckage said they were transiting the area of the accident when they
received a signal from the accident airplane's emergency locator transmitter
(ELT). He said the area had an overcast cloud cover, which was underneath
them. He located clear air where they could descend, and returned to the
accident site underneath the overcast. He said they could see up the
glacier, and that there was about 200 feet of clearance between the saddle
at the top of the glacier and the cloud cover. He said as they passed over
the accident site approaching the saddle, their navigation instruments
indicated a 40-knot headwind, and that the mountaintops on either side of
the glacier were obscured by clouds. The aircraft commander said they were
able to circle in a bowl near the accident site for a short time until
deteriorating weather forced them back on top of the overcast.
In a
written statement to the NTSB dated January 27, the pilot wrote that while
maneuvering in the mountains at 4,500 feet altitude, he encountered what he
believed was severe turbulence and downdrafts.
An
area weather forecast, valid at the time of the accident, indicated areas of
marginal VFR weather with rain and snow showers. The forecast does not
indicate any turbulence. The closest automated weather reporting facility is
at the Seward Airport, about 7 miles from the accident site. Observations
taken during the timeframe of the accident indicate rapidly varying
visibilities from 10 miles to less than 1 mile, and ceilings varying from
100 feet to 6,000 feet.
The
National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows: The pilot's inadequate weather evaluation, which
resulted in an in-flight encounter with low ceilings, turbulence, and
downdrafts in cruise flight, and the pilot's failure to maintain
altitude/clearance while maneuvering, which resulted in an in-flight
collision with terrain. Factors associated with the accident were low
ceilings, turbulence, and downdrafts.
Aircraft:
Cessna 180
Where: Seward, Alaska
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Phase of Flight: Maneuvering
About 1100 Alaska Standard time, a wheel-equipped Cessna 180 airplane
sustained substantial damage when it collided with terrain during
maneuvering flight, about 7 miles east of Seward, Alaska. The airplane was
being operated by the pilot as a visual flight rules (VFR) personal
cross-country flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident
occurred. The airline transport pilot received serious injuries, and the
sole passenger received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed the Quartz
Creek airstrip, Cooper Landing, Alaska, about 1030.
A U.S. Coast Guard C-130 airplane from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, was
flying in the area of the accident, and received an emergency signal from
the accident airplane's emergency locator transmitter (ELT), about 1205. The
Coast Guard airplane located the accident airplane on the Godwin Glacier,
and relayed its location to the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in
Anchorage, Alaska. A helicopter from the Alaska, Air National Guard, 210th
Rescue Squadron, was dispatched to the scene, but was unable to reach the
site due to clouds obscuring the accident site. After aborting several
attempts to reach the site due to weather on the glacier, the helicopter
made it to the site about 2000.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), the Air National Guard para-rescue
technician who made initial contact with the pilot, said the pilot told him
he had been flying up the glacier, encountered a downdraft, and was being
pushed down. He said the pilot told him he turned down slope to "escape"
when the airplane contacted the glacier. The rescue technician described the
accident site as a snow-covered glacial slope of 10 degrees or less, about
4,100 feet in elevation, and noted that they were able to land their
helicopter on the slope. He said the airplane contacted the glacier up slope
from where it had come to rest, and that the landing gear had separated from
the airplane, and lay upslope from the main wreckage.
During an interview with the NTSB IIC and an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector
on, the pilot said he departed Cooper Landing for a private airstrip he
frequents at Cape Junken, Alaska, which is typically a 30-minute flight. He
said his general routine is to fly over Seward, cross a saddle near the top
of the glacier at 4,500 feet above sea level, and proceed to Cape Junken. He
said he did not recall anything out of the ordinary, and said there were no
problems with the airplane or its engine. He said he does not have any
independent recollection of the accident.
During a telephone conversation with the NTSB, the aircraft commander of the
Coast Guard C-130 airplane that located the wreckage said they were
transiting the area of the accident when they received a signal from the
accident airplane's emergency locator transmitter (ELT). He said the area
had an overcast cloud cover, which was underneath them. He located clear air
where they could descend, and returned to the accident site underneath the
overcast. He said they could see up the glacier, and that there was about
200 feet of clearance between the saddle at the top of the glacier and the
cloud cover. He said as they passed over the accident site approaching the
saddle, their navigation instruments indicated a 40-knot headwind, and that
the mountaintops on either side of the glacier were obscured by clouds. The
aircraft commander said they were able to circle in a bowl near the accident
site for a short time until deteriorating weather forced them back on top of
the overcast.
In a written statement to the NTSB, the pilot wrote that while maneuvering
in the mountains at 4,500 feet altitude, he encountered what he believed was
severe turbulence and downdrafts.
An area weather forecast valid at the time of the accident, indicated areas
of marginal VFR weather with rain and snow showers. The forecast does not
indicate any turbulence. The closest automated weather reporting facility is
at the Seward Airport, about 7 miles from the accident site. Observations
taken during the timeframe of the accident indicate rapidly varying
visibilities from 10 miles to less than 1 mile, and ceilings varying from
100 feet to 6,000 feet.
The airplane was not recovered from the glacier. No pieces or parts of the
accident airplane were examined by NTSB.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows: The pilot's inadequate weather evaluation, which
resulted in an in-flight encounter with low ceilings, turbulence, and
downdrafts in cruise flight, and the pilot's failure to maintain
altitude/clearance while maneuvering, which resulted in an in-flight
collision with terrain. Factors associated with the accident were low
ceilings, turbulence, and downdrafts.
Aircraft: Cessna 180A Where: Mercer Island, WA Injuries: None Phase of Flight: Landing A float-equipped Cessna 180A impacted the water during a landing on the waters of Lake Washington, near Mercer Island, Washington. The commercial pilot and his two passengers were not injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal pleasure flight, which departed the waters of Roche Island, Washington, about one hour and fifteen minutes earlier, was being operated in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan had been filed. There was no report of an ELT activation. According to the pilot, he was landing in relatively smooth water in light and variable wind conditions. Just after touchdown, the aircraft encountered a large rolling wave that the pilot had not noticed prior to landing. As a result of passing over the wave, the aircraft was thrown back into the air to a height of at least 10 feet. At that point the pilot added power in order to initiate a go-around, but the aircraft did not have sufficient airspeed to maintain flight. It therefore dropped back onto the surface of the water with sufficient force to create substantial damage in the aircraft structure. Although the pilot noticed a couple of small boat wakes when he circled the area prior to landing, he did not notice the large rolling wave/swell that he subsequently encountered. It was his opinion that the wave had been created by a large boat that had departed the area prior to his landing. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: the pilot's inadequate visual lookout during an approach and landing in open water. Factors include a large wave/swell at the location where the pilot elected to land his float-equipped airplane. Source: National Transportation Board
Aircraft:
Cessna 182Q
Where: Rutland, VT
Injuries: None
Phase of Flight: Landing
A Cessna
182Q, N97996, was substantially damaged during a landing at Rutland State
Airport (RUT), Rutland, Vermont. The certificated private pilot was not
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that
originated at Burlington International Airport (BTV), Burlington, Vermont,
at 1200. No flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14
CFR Part 91.
In a written statement, the pilot reported that she was originally headed
for North Hampton, Massachusetts. While en route, she encountered moderate
turbulence and haze, and elected to land at Rutland Airport. As she
approached Rutland, she obtained wind information on three different
occasions. Winds at the airport were reported as being from 270 to 280
degrees, about 20 knots.
The pilot elected to land on runway 01 instead of runway 31 because it was
longer, and there were no trees on the end. She aborted the first landing
attempt, because she was too high. On the second landing attempt, the pilot
made a crosswind landing. Once on the ground, she began pumping the brakes,
but couldn't stop the airplane from going off the end of the runway. The
airplane traveled down a steep embankment and flipped over.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector interviewed the pilot over
the telephone. According to the inspector, the pilot said that she floated
down the runway, and had difficulty getting the airplane on the ground. Once
on the ground, she did not have enough distance to abort the landing safely.
An FAA inspector performed an examination of the airplane. According to the
inspector, the airplane sustained damage to both wings, the firewall was
wrinkled, both wing struts were bent, and both propeller blades were
damaged.
The pilot reported a total of 165 flight hours, of which, 47 hours were in
make and model. The pilot also reported that there were no mechanical
deficiencies.
Runway 01 was a 5,000-foot-long by 100-foot-wide asphalt runway.
Weather at Rutland Airport, at 1315, included winds from 260 degrees at 10
knots gusting to 23 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, and scattered clouds
at 8,000 feet.
The
National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to attain
the proper touchdown point. A factor was the crosswind.Aircraft: Cessna 182G Where: Taylorsville, North Carolina Injuries: 1 minor Phase of Flight: Takeoff At 1333 Eastern Standard Time, a Cessna 182G, registered to a private owner, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, collided with an embankment on takeoff roll at Taylorsville Airport, Taylorsville, North Carolina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The private pilot reported minor injuries. The flight originated from Teague-Grider Airport, Taylorsville, North Carolina. The pilot stated he started his takeoff roll on the west runway, and just before rotation his seat slid backwards. The pilot reported that he "lost directional control" of the airplane and the airplane subsequently collided with an embankment. Examination of the front seats revealed both seat track rails were buckled. The seat track pin holes were measured at 0.28 inches longitudinal and sideways dimensions. Air Worthiness Directive 87-20-03R2, Seat Tracks, requires inspection of all pin holes at 100-hour intervals. Replacement of the seat rail becomes mandatory once any dimension exceeds 0.42. No elongation of the seat track pin holes was noted. Review of the Cessna 182 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section I, states in the BEFORE STARTING THE ENGINE checklist, "(1) Seats and Seat Belts-Adjust and lock." Aircraft: Cessna 182L Where: Boca Raton, FL Injuries: None Phase of flight: Forced Landing About 1315 eastern standard time, a Cessna 182L, operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed while attempting a forced landing in the vicinity of Boca Raton, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft received substantial damage, and the commercially-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The aircraft departed Pompano Beach Airpark about 15 minutes before the accident. According to the pilot, on his return trip to his home base near West Palm Beach, his engine surged and lost power. He chose an uninhabited north-bound lane of the Florida Turnpike for a forced landing. The left wing impacted a road sign during the landing rollout, causing substantial damage. The pilot stated he did not observe wing tank fuel level before departure. He stated that about 50 gallons must have been siphoned from his tanks while parked at his home base. According to an FAA inspector, the sign collision damaged the wing leading edge about 2 to 3 feet inboard of the wing tip. The collision caused deformation of the left wing spar, a wing rib, and the false front spar. Neither wing fuel tank was breached and about 1.5 to 2.5 gallons of 100 octane LL was the total fuel found in the aircraft. The fuel was removed from the aircraft at the time the salvager removed the wings for transport to a locked and secured salvage and storage facility at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. At the storage facility where the aircraft was transported to and stored, the NTSB observed the aircraft engine start from its own battery source. Also observed was the fuel removed from the aircraft, post crash, and the amount measured to be 2.5 gallons. The engine was operated at about 2,000 rpm for about 10 minutes. Engine operation was smooth and responsive to cockpit controls. According to the Cessna 182L type certificate data sheets, the unusable fuel is 30 pounds or about 5.1 gallons. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: The pilot's failure to perform a proper preflight inspection and refueling of the aircraft, resulting in an in-flight loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion and a collision with a road sign during the emergency landing. Source: National Transportation Board
Aircraft:
Cessna A185F
Where: Grand Junction, CO
Injuries: 4 fatal
Phase of flight: Cruise and
maneuvering
At 1817
mountain standard time, a Cessna A185F was destroyed when it impacted
terrain approximately 20 miles east of Grand Junction, Colorado. The
commercial pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for
the personal flight being conducted under Title 14 CFR Part 91. The flight
originated at Walker Field, Grand Junction, Colorado, at 1812, and was en
route to Eagle, Colorado.
According
to employees at Timberline Aviation, the pilot landed at the airport between
1600 and 1630. He and his passengers left by automobile and were gone for
about an hour. When they returned, they loaded a fiberglass shower enclosure
into the airplane. At 1810:10, the pilot contacted ground control for taxi
clearance. He was given his choice of runways 29 or 22 because the wind was
from 230 degrees to 280 degrees at 24 knots. The pilot said he would taxi
"half way down two nine and we'll take a look." At 1811:29, the pilot
requested and was cleared for takeoff on runway 29 from the taxiway A4
intersection. [According to the controller, 5100 feet of runway was
available for takeoff from the A4 intersection.] He was given his choice of
a left or right turn to the northeast. The pilot said, "Let's see what the
wind does here." The tower controller said that during the takeoff roll, the
airplane drifted off the right side of the runway and stirred up a cloud of
dust. Witnesses at Timberline Aviation said they, too, saw the dust cloud,
but thought it was due to propeller wash or a wind gust. They said it was
"windy as hell," and the winds were "howling." The controller said that as
soon as the airplane lifted off the runway, it immediately "took on a
pronounced crab to the left into the wind." The pilot remarked, "Well, that
was gustier than I thought, guys. I would like the left turn out." The
controller replied, "...looks pretty rough up there. Left turn out
approved." After approving the pilot's request to cross the airport
midfield, the controller remarked, "Sure does not look like an attractive
flight this evening." The pilot answered, "No, but it is time to go home, so
we'll get on up to Eagle. We'll see you guys in a couple of days." This was
the last transmission from the pilot, recorded at 1814:26.
A Vail Jet
Center employee coming to work noticed the pilot's automobile parked in the
parking lot. The pilot's dog was still inside. He became concerned because
she knew the pilot had departed the previous evening. She telephoned the
pilot's fiancé and learned he did not come home the previous evening. She
telephoned FAA's Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) in Denver and
reported the airplane missing. At 0722, FAA issued an Alert Notification
(ALNOT). A searching helicopter located the wreckage at a location of 39
degrees, 08.933' north latitude, and 108 degrees, 24.948' west longitude,
about 8 miles northeast of the Grand Junction Airport. The ALNOT was then
cancelled.
PERSONNEL (CREW) INFORMATION
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane
single/multiengine land, single engine sea, and instrument ratings. He also
held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single/multiengine and
instrument ratings, and a mechanic's certificate with airframe and
powerplant ratings and an inspector authorization. When the pilot applied
for his second-class airman medical certificate, he estimated he had
accumulated 4,400 hours total flying time, 75 hours of which were accrued in
the previous 6 months. His medical certificate contained the limitation,
"Must wear corrective lenses."
The pilot's
logbook was not found. His family, however, gave an FAA inspector permission
to examine the contents of the pilot's personal computer hard drive. The
hard drive contained his flight log, with entries from 1987 to 2003.
According to this data, the pilot had logged no less than 3,068.8 hours
total flight time, and no less than 434 hours had been logged in the
accident aircraft. His last flight review and FAA Wings VI proficiency was
accomplished in a Cessna 340. His last tail wheel recurrency flight was
dated January 20, 2003. His last flight in the airplane was for 8.3 hours.
According
to the pilot's resume, he said he had been employed for 4 years (1994-1998)
as a network engineer for an Eagle computer company. He also served as the
company's pilot and flight instructor, and maintained its Cessna T210 and
Cessna 340. From 1991 to1994, he was self-employed as an aircraft pilot and
mechanic. From 1988 to 1991, an Avon, Colorado, company that had acquired a
Cessna 414A employed him. He refurbished the airplane and placed it on an
FAA 14 CFR Part 135 certificate (air taxi). He served as the company's
pilot, charter pilot, and mechanic. From 1986 to 1988, he managed a
maintenance shop and flight school for a private individual, and flew as a
charter pilot. From 1970 to 1986, he maintained and delivered airplanes in
the Caribbean, and crop-dusted for 3 years in Belize.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The Cessna Aircraft Company manufactured the accident airplane, a model
A185F (s/n 18502313), in 1974. It was equipped with a Continental IO-520-D
engine (s/n 293424-R), rated at 300 horsepower, and a McCauley two blade,
all-metal, constant speed propeller (m/n). According to the most recent FAA
registration certificate, dated January 8, 2001, the airplane was
certificated in the restricted category, and approved for "agriculture and
pest control" operations only.
The
airplane's maintenance records were not found. The pilot's personal computer
hard drive contained a limited amount of maintenance information. According
to the data, a factory-remanufactured engine and an overhauled propeller
were installed, and an annual inspection was performed on September 27,
2000. Tachometer and total airframe time was 1,507.0 hours. The oil was
changed and the oil filter was replaced at a tachometer of 1,550.0 hours, or
43.0 hours since the last annual inspection. Another annual inspection was
performed at a tachometer time of 1,630.6 hours. The oil was changed at a
tachometer time of 1729.0 hours. An additional 25 hours were flown after the
oil change. Total airframe time was 1,754.0 hours at the time of the
accident.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
According to the U.S. Naval Observatory, official sunset occurred in Grand
Junction at 1832.
Nearby
workmen said that on the evening of the accident, there was scattered rain
showers of moderate intensity in the area.
Weather
observed at Grand Junction (GJT), the point of departure; Rifle (RIL), the
approximate midpoint, and Eagle (EGE), the destination, was as follows:
GJT (1753): Wind, 260 degrees at 22 knots, gusts to 28 knots; visibility, 10
statute miles (or greater); ceiling, 10,000 feet broken; temperature 18
degrees Celsius; dew point, -4 degrees Celsius; altimeter, 29.65 inches;
remarks, precipitation discriminator, peak wind, 270 degrees at 29 knots, 40
minutes past the hour, sea level pressure 1007 millibars.
RIL (1753): Wind, 240 degrees at 6 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles (or
greater); ceiling 10,000 feet overcast; temperature, 14 degrees Celsius; dew
point, -3 degrees Celsius; altimeter, 29.63 inches; remarks, precipitation
discriminator, sea level pressure 1011 millibars.
EGE (1755): Wind, 240 degrees at 13 knots, gusts to 29 knots; visibility, 10
statute miles (or greater); sky condition, few clouds at 2,900 feet, 3,800
feet scattered; ceiling, 4,700 feet broken; temperature, 12 degrees Celsius;
dew point, -7 degrees Celsius; altimeter, 29.67 inches; remarks,
precipitation discriminator.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT
INFORMATION
The wreckage was located on a horse refuge in Debeque Canyon, part of the
Coal Creek drainage on the Grand Mesa, about 8 miles northeast of Grand
Junction. The accident site was between two 6,500-foot ridgelines, oriented
northwest to southeast and approximately one mile apart. The accident site
was at the 5,900-foot level. The airplane impacted 30-degree upslope rocky
terrain on a magnetic heading of 250 degrees and came to rest inverted. The
impact heading was opposite that from Grand Junction to Eagle, and pointed
back towards Grand Junction.
The engine
was pushed aft towards the top of the cockpit area. Bark from a nearby scrub
tree was embedded in the engine. The separated propeller lay nearby. The
fuselage of the aircraft was crushed inward and aft. Both cabin doors
separated from the fuselage. The right cabin door had a clothesline tied
around the door handle. The front two seats were identified. The left seat
was partially attached to the seat track; the right seat was ejected. Both
seatbelts were attached to the fuselage structure, but neither was fastened.
The rear two seats were not present, but two sets of unfastened seatbelts
were observed in the aft cabin area.
The
altimeter indicated 7,100 feet, and the Kollsman window was set to 29.74.
The attitude indicator showed a descent, and the heading indicator indicated
150 degrees. These three instruments were the only intact instruments found
at the accident site.
The right
and left wing separated from the fuselage. The left wing was crushed aft
along the leading edge in an accordion fashion. The left aileron and left
flap separated from the wing. The strut was bent down and aft mid-span. The
right wing was crushed aft along the leading edge in an accordion manner.
The aileron and flap remained attached. The empennage was partially
separated from the fuselage. The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to
the tail cone. The leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was
crushed aft along the leading edge in an accordion fashion. The left
horizontal stabilizer was crushed aft on the inboard side of the leading
edge. Both elevators remained attached. The left elevator torque tube was
broken. The vertical stabilizer was crushed inward and aft, and was
deflected to the left. The top of the rudder was bent aft. The rudder cables
remained attached to the rudder. All flight controls were identified, and
partial flight control continuity was established.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL
INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Mesa County Coroner's office in
Grand Junction Colorado.
FAA's Civil
Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed
toxicological tests on the pilot. According to CAMI's report, there was no
evidence of drugs and ethanol in muscle tissue. Carbon monoxide and cyanide
tests could not be performed.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
Recorded NTAP (National Track Analysis Program) radar data retrieved from
Denver's Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) was provided to search and
rescue personnel, and this data was instrumental in locating the airplane.
According to the data, the aircraft began a left turn away from runway 29 at
1813:23. At 1814:26, it crossed the airport midfield. Ground speed was 138
knots and the track was 091degrees. There were no altitude returns
throughout the flight. The last radar contact was at 1816:45, when the
airplane was at a location of 39 degrees, 08'18" north latitude, and 108
degrees, 24'54" west longitude. Its ground speed was 160 knots, and its
heading had changed from a previous 063 degrees to 048 degrees.
An engine
inspection was conducted. There was no evidence of pre-impact abnormalities.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The two front seats were located near to the wreckage. The two rear seats
were later located in the pilot's aircraft hangar in Eagle, Colorado.
According to Title 14 CFR Part 91.107, (a)(3), "Each person on board a
U.S.-registered civil aircraft must occupy an approved seat or berth with a
safety belt and, if installed, a shoulder harness, properly secured about
him or her during movement on the surface, takeoff and landing."
The
aircraft was certificated in the restricted category and approved for
"agriculture and pest control" operations only. According to Title 14 CFR
Part 91.313(a)(1)(2), "No person may operate a restricted category aircraft
(1) for other than the special purpose for which it is certificated, or (2)
in an operation other than one necessary to accomplish the work activity
directly associated with that special purpose." 91.313(d)(1) through (4)
states, "No person may be carried on a restricted category civil aircraft
unless that person (1) is a flight crew member. (2) is a flight crewmember
trainee; (3) performs an essential function in connection with a special
purpose operation for which the aircraft is certificated, or (4) is
necessary to accomplish the work activity directly associated with that
special purpose."
According
to the Mesa County Sheriff's Office and Civil Air patrol, the pilot had a
reputation as being a "cowboy," "thrill seeker," and "hot dog."
The pilot
was involved in a non-fatal midair collision, at Greeley, Colorado (see DEN
99-F-A077A/B). At the time, he was giving flight instruction in a Cessna
T210N.
In addition
to the Federal Aviation Administration, parties to the investigation
included the Cessna Aircraft Company and Teledyne Continental Motors.
The
National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows: The pilot's poor judgment and his failure to
maintain aircraft control. Contributing factors were the high winds and
downdrafts, and the pilot's self-induced pressure to go home.
Aircraft: Cessna 195
Where: Aspen, CO
Injuries: 4 Fatal
Phase of Flight: In Flight
At
approximately 1120 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 195 single-engine
airplane was destroyed when it collided with terrain while maneuvering 7.4
miles northeast of Aspen, Colorado. The airplane was registered to and
operated by the airline transport pilot. The pilot and his three passengers
received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a
visual flight rules flight plan was filed, but not activated. The flight
departed the Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (ASE) at 1106, and was enroute to
the Front Range Airport, Watkins, Colorado, at the time of the accident.
According to family members, the pilot flew the airplane from the Front
Range Airport to ASE earlier on the morning of the accident. After having
breakfast at Aspen, the pilot and his passengers boarded the airplane for
the return flight to Watkins.
Radar
data depicted the airplane departing ASE, flying north down the Roaring Fork
River Valley, then turning right to fly southeast up the Woody Creek Valley.
The last radar return depicted the airplane at 8,388 feet msl (approximately
148 feet above the terrain).
At
1630, a missing aircraft report was issued by the FAA based on family
concerns when the aircraft did not arrive at the Front Range Airport. The
Civil Air Patrol commenced an aerial search. Approximately 0745, the search
airplanes found the accident site in the Woody Creek Valley, approximately
5.5 miles east of the location of the last radar return.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The
pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane
multi-engine land rating and type ratings in the Boeing 737, 757, 767, and
777 aircraft. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane
single-engine land rating, and current flight instructor ratings for
single-engine and instrument airplanes. The pilot was issued a first class
medical certificate with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses and
possess glasses for near and interim vision." According to the medical
application, the pilot reported that he had accumulated a total of 5,800
flight hours. It is not known how many hours were accumulated in the
accident airplane.
AIRPORT & SURROUNDING AREA INFORMATION
The
ASE airport is located north of the city of Aspen at an elevation of 7,815
feet msl. A review of the Airport Facility Directory entry for ASE revealed
that it stated that "unique VFR departure procedures exist." The departure
procedures stated that "as soon as possible, but no later than crossing
airport boundary, turn right to a heading of 360 degrees - a 30-degree right
turn from runway heading - hold this heading for at least 2 miles from the
airport. NOTE: It is recognized that aircraft performance will differ with
aircraft type and takeoff conditions; therefore, the aircraft operator must
have the latitude to determine whether takeoff thrust should be reduced
prior to, during, or after flap retraction."
According to local pilots, the normal procedure for departing Aspen and
flying to the Denver area is to fly north, down the Roaring Fork River
Valley, until the aircraft has enough altitude to reach the Ruedi Reservoir.
A review of this route on the sectional aeronautical chart revealed that
after takeoff, the pilot would have had to fly the airplane north-northwest
approximately 8 to 10 nautical miles toward the town of Basalt prior to
turning east toward the Ruedi Reservoir. The Woody Creek Valley branches off
the Roaring Fork River Valley approximately 3 miles north of the airport.
The Woody Creek Valley is surrounded by rapidly rising terrain on each side,
and terminates at the Williams Mountains, which have a ridgeline with
elevations between 12,000 and 12,700 feet msl.
An
NTSB database search for accidents occurring over a 16-year period in the
vicinity of the Aspen airport revealed that there were 8 accidents, 4 of
which involved fatalities, in the accident site area that cited the high
mountains and aircraft performance exceeded as causal and/or contributing
factors.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The
1949 model 4-seat airplane was equipped with a 300-horsepower Jacobs R755-A2
radial engine. The aircraft maintenance records were not located during the
investigation; however, an invoice and accompanying periodic aircraft
inspection report indicated that the airplane underwent its last annual
inspection at a tachometer time of 4,282.0 hours.
A
calculation of weight and balance was conducted using estimated fuel and
passenger weights. The estimated weight and balance was within the
manufacturer's limitations.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At
1053, the Aspen weather observation facility reported the wind from 330
degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 6,000
feet and broken clouds at 15,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees Celsius, dew
point 4 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.01 inches of
mercury. The density altitude was calculated by an NTSB investigator to be
10,518 feet.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The
accident site was located at 9,860 feet msl. The wreckage distribution path,
including an area of broken and cut trees, was oriented along a measured
magnetic heading of 257 degrees (almost opposite the direction of flight
depicted on the radar track) and measured approximately 130 feet in length.
A fire consumed the cockpit/cabin area. The empennage remained partially
attached to the fuselage and sustained impact damage. The vertical
stabilizer and rudder, and the left horizontal stabilizer and elevator
remained attached to the empennage. The right horizontal stabilizer was
found separated from the empennage, but came to rest next to the empennage.
The outboard portions of the wings were separated from the airplane and
displayed leading edge damage. The right wing came to rest under freshly
broken trees. The wings' fracture surfaces displayed characteristics
consistent with overload failure. Flight control continuity was confirmed
from the rudder and left elevator to the cabin area; however, due to the
wing damage, confirmation of aileron control continuity was not possible.
The
engine sustained fire damage and remained attached to the airplane via
control cables, and the propeller remained attached to the engine. Three
cylinders were found separated from the crankcase and one was partially
melted. Both propeller blades displayed chordwise scoring and fresh cuts
were found in some of the fallen tree branches. The engine was relocated to
a salvage facility where the spark plugs were removed and examined. The
spark plugs appeared new and did not display any unusual wear or combustion
properties. The engine's accessory section sustained impact and/or fire
damage.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An
autopsy was not conducted on the pilot. A toxicological test on the pilot
for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and drugs was performed. The results
were negative.
The
National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows: The pilot's poor in-flight decision to fly up a
valley with rapidly rising terrain, which resulted in the airplane colliding
with the terrain due to its climb performance being exceeded. A contributing
factor was the high, rapidly rising, mountainous terrain.
Aircraft: Cessna U206G Where: Killkarney Lake Idaho Injuries: None Phase of Flight: Landing About 1320 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna U206G sustained substantial damage after striking powerlines while on final approach to Killkarney Lake, located approximately 5 nautical miles southwest of Rose Lake, Idaho. The commercial pilot and his two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the on-demand charter flight, which was operated under the provisions of Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight originated from Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, approximately 20 minutes prior to the accident. In a written statement, the pilot reported that prior to the approach and landing he flew over the area at approximately 500 feet above ground level (AGL) to determine the direction of the wind and to look for logs and debris in the lake. The pilot stated that he was approaching the north end of the lake on a southerly heading and near the lake's edge at approximately 50 feet AGL when he saw the wires. The pilot reported that he immediately added full power to raise the nose when the top wire went over the top of the floats, catching the float struts. The pilot stated that the wire broke off the right side but was still entangled on the left side, pulling the airplane down. The pilot reported that he then pulled the nose up before impacting the water. Damage to the aircraft included the left hand front door frame post being cracked, the upper top cabin skin wrinkled, and the left hand cabin bulkhead bent. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's failure to maintain clearance with the powerlines on final approach which resulted in a hard landing. A factor contributing to the accident were the powerlines.Aircraft:
Cessna 206H Where: Mayville, NY Injuries: 1 serious Phase of Flight: Cruise At 0615 Eastern Daylight Time, a Cessna 206H was destroyed after an in-flight explosion, and a subsequent forced landing to a field in Mayville, New York. The certificated commercial pilot was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Chautauqua County Airport (DKK), Dunkirk, New York, and Port Meadville Airport (GKJ), Meadville, Pennsylvania. The business flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that he departed Dunkirk at 0610. According to two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors, who interviewed the pilot while he was in the hospital, the pilot stated that, after takeoff, he climbed the airplane to 4,000 feet. Just after level-off, the pilot checked the gauges "and found them to be all in the green." His power setting was 2,500 rpm and 25 inches of manifold pressure, and "as he was accustomed, he backed the throttle a hair to 24/24." The pilot then engaged the autopilot, and the engine was running smoothly, with no vibrations. "All was fine for about 35 to 40 seconds. Then he heard a loud explosion ('Kaboom!!') followed by an increase in engine rpm." During the explosion, the pilot saw the engine cowls "bow up". The cowl fasteners also blew out, and fire came out through the fastener holes. The pilot started to turn the airplane towards a field he had seen earlier. Meanwhile, "blue and yellow flames were constantly coming from the engine compartment and coming right around the window." During the turn, there was a second explosion. The pilot thought the engine was still running until that time, and quit after the second blast. After the second explosion, the cabin became completely engulfed in smoke. The pilot cracked the left window, and found an area where he could "sip" fresh air. The view ahead of him was completely black due to the amount of smoke. The pilot continued toward what he thought was the field, based on his available vision to the side. However, during the final approach, the airplane struck trees. The pilot was surprised, and pulled full back on the yoke. The airplane then stalled, and fell straight to the ground. After the pilot was released from the hospital, he provided amplifying information to the Safety Board. In a telephone interview, he stated that during the preflight, he checked the oil cap three times to make sure it was in and locked. The pilot also confirmed that there was no problem with the engine prior to the first explosion. "It was purring like a kitten." After he leveled off the airplane, he set the power and engaged the autopilot. Less than a minute later, it seemed like a stick of dynamite went off. Blue flames and fire came through the cowling. The engine continued to run smoothly, and may have even sped up a little. There were no "clanking" sounds emanating from the engine before the first explosion. Immediately after the explosion, the pilot put the flaps down, and turned towards a field he had seen. During the turn, a second explosion occurred. The dash was blown in, and there was so much fire and smoke, that visibility within the cockpit was reduced to the blackness of night. The pilot couldn't breathe, and he couldn't see, except out the side window. After the second explosion, the engine quit running. A witness to the accident stated that he was inside his house when he heard the sound of the airplane's engine, then a "pop sound." He looked outside, and saw the airplane "about treetop high and the right front side was on fire...near the engine." He saw the airplane make several left turns, then lost sight of it behind the trees, and eventually located the wreckage by following rising smoke. The accident occurred during civil twilight, about 20 minutes before sunrise.
PILOT INFORMATION The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single engine land and multi-engine land airplanes. He reported that he had about 3,135 hours of flight time, and 100 hours in make and model.
AIRPLANE INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in May 1999, and according to the operator, had about 340 hours of operating time. The engine was a Textron Lycoming IO-540-AC1A5. According to maintenance records, the "New Reciprocating Engine Certificate" was dated January 1, 1999. The engine was serviced with mineral oil for the first 50 hours. An annual inspection was completed at 100.0 hours. A Tanis engine preheater system was installed. Another annual inspection was completed at 201.7 hours. All six of the cylinder assemblies were removed and replaced due to high oil consumption. Another annual inspection was completed, at 300.0 hours.
WRECKAGE INFORMATION On the day of the accident, an on-scene examination was conducted by a Rochester Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) FAA inspector, who was joined by the operator. According to the FSDO inspector, there were broken limbs in tree line near the wreckage. There was also a gash in the ground, from the tree line, about 50 feet, to the wreckage. The wreckage had been sprayed with water and foam by a local fire company. The airplane's cockpit, instrument panel, and fuselage were destroyed by fire. All three landing gear were collapsed. The right engine cowling was found on the left side of the airplane, near the propeller, while the left engine cowling was still attached. Removal of the left cowling revealed a 5-inch crack in the engine case, in the vicinity of the number 6 cylinder. The engine was subsequently moved to a hangar owned by the operator, and the airframe was moved to a different location, belonging to a salvage company. Arrangements were made to have representatives from Cessna Aircraft Company and Textron Lycoming, along with another FSDO inspector and an FAA inspector from the Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, join the FSDO inspector in examining the wreckage on the following day. The group proceeded to operator's hangar for an engine examination. The oil suction screen was pulled, and metal particles and debris were found on it. The oil sump plug was removed and a mixture of water and a small amount of oil were drained out. Fire damage was noted to the accessory case and the firewall, with fire damage more severe on the left side of the engine. The bottom of the engine-driven fuel pump was missing. The oil filler tube and the top portion of the oil dipstick were missing. The engine was prepared for shipment to Textron Lycoming, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, for a teardown examination. The group stopped at Dunkirk Airport to examine the ramp area and the airplane's parking spot. No oil was noted in either place. The group then proceeded to the salvage yard, and found the remainder of the wreckage still on the flatbed truck that had transported it. Examination of the airframe remnants revealed that there was oil on the bottom surfaces of the wings and the empennage. The right engine cowling had oil on it in the vicinity of the oil filler cap. The left engine cowling exhibited evidence consistent with heat damage. The engine underwent the teardown examination under Safety Board supervision at Textron Lycoming. The examination revealed that the engine's rear accessory section was fire-damaged, and both the right and left magnetos were melted. The oil filler tube was missing; however, the dipstick was still inserted into the engine. The oil filter was fire-damaged, and the bottom of the engine driven fuel pump was burned away. The fuel boost pump was intact. Externally, the engine oil pump was rusted and fire-damaged. There was light scoring on the internal body walls, but no damage to the impellers. The engine would not rotate; however, engine continuity was confirmed, with the exception of the separated number 6 connecting rod. There was metal contamination in the oil sump. Internal timing could not be verified due to heat and rust damage to the accessory drive gears. All spark plugs were gray in color, with the exception of an oil/water-wet number 2 bottom plug, and a corroded number 4 top plug. The connecting rod bearings had an appearance consistent with oil starvation and wiping. The number 6 connecting rod bearing was in pieces, in the sump. No damage was noted to any of the main bearings. The crankcase oil galley and oil holes were open and free of debris.
TESTS AND RESEARCH The number 3, 5, and 6 connecting rod assemblies were forwarded to the Safety Board Materials Laboratory for examination. According to the metallurgist's factual report, the pieces from the number 6 rod were darkly discolored, "as if severely overheated." Further examination revealed that "mechanical damage completely obliterated fracture features on the smaller separated pieces of the connecting rod and cap." One of the number 6 connecting rod bolts was separated. "The separated ends of the bolt were deformed by bending." The facture face of the head portion was completely destroyed by "post-separation damage," while the fracture face on the shank had "cup and cone features, typical of tensile overload. The 'intact' bolt from the connecting rod...was also deformed by bending." The report also stated: "The crankshaft ends of connecting rods numbers 5 and 3 also had evidence of heat discoloration; however, significantly less severe than in rod number 6. The connecting rod bolts in both rods were intact but the bearing shells were deformed and heavily scored."
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Photographic evidence of the interior side of the right cowling revealed oil residue on the aft, bottom quadrant. The residue appeared generally to be unburned; however, there were specks of soot on, or imbedded in, the residue. There was also some light sooting on the aft, top quadrant of the interior side of the cowling, with heavy sooting near the cowling's aft, top edge. Photographic evidence of the interior side of the left engine cowling revealed heavy sooting on the aft, upper quadrant. There was also scorching within the aft, upper part of that quadrant. In an email, another Cessna 206H owner stated that the dipstick/oil filler cap on his airplane's engine required a "real firm" tightening, or it would back itself out. The owner also noted that two or three times he came back from flights, and the cap was "completely open." However, even though the cap was open, there was "no oil loss or indications of oil spewing out." Textron Lycoming issued Mandatory Service Bulletin number 545, which required oil filler tube and clamp replacement on certain IO-540-AC1A5 engines. The serial number of the oil filler tube adapter determined which engines were affected; however, the accident engine was not one of them. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: An engine compartment explosion due to a fuel/fuel vapor leak of undetermined origin. A secondary explosion resulted from a lack of lubrication to the number 6 connecting rod bearing. Contributing to the pilot's injuries was his reduced visibility during the forced landing, resulting from a heavy concentration of smoke in the cockpit.Aircraft: Cessna T206H Where: Chickaloon, AK Injuries: 3 fatal Phase of Flight: En route About 1000 Alaska daylight time, a wheel-equipped Cessna T206H airplane was destroyed by impact and post-impact fire when it collided with mountainous terrain while maneuvering, about 23.5 miles east-northeast of Chickaloon, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country personal flight when the accident occurred. The private certificated pilot and the two passengers received fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. A VFR flight plan was filed from Homer, Alaska, to Whitehorse, Canada. The flight originated at the Homer Airport, about 0752. At 0645, the pilot telephoned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Kenai Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) and filed a VFR flight plan. He stated, in part: "...departure point is Homer, proposed departure is 0800, altitude 5,500 feet (msl), route of flight is direct Potter Marsh (Anchorage, Alaska), direct Birchwood (Chugiak, Alaska), direct Palmer, then Gulkana, via Sheep Pass, Tahneta Pass, direct Northway, direct Whitehorse." He indicated the en route time as 4.5 hours, with 5.5 hours of fuel on-board the airplane. The route of flight specified by the pilot included terrain that went from sea level to mountainous, and generally followed Alaska Highway 1 through the mountains. The mountainous portion of the flight, where the accident occurred, is located between Palmer, Alaska, and Gulkana, Alaska, and traverses Tahneta Pass. Commonly used points of geographical reference, eastbound along the highway from Palmer, are Sutton, Chickaloon, Sheep Mountain, Gunsight Mountain, Tahneta Pass, Eureka, Snowshoe Lake, Tazlina, Tolsona, and then Gulkana. The pilot obtained a standard weather briefing about the route of flight. The flight service station specialist provided a synopsis that stated, in part: "...we got a stationary low just north of Fairbanks and another low in the eastern Gulf, basically just southwest of Yakutat. It's moving to the northeast at about 5 knots, it looks like the occluded front is arcing still south of your route, but that would be something to keep an eye on today." The specialist provided a weather advisory for Cook Inlet and Susitna Valley, valid through 0900, for isolated IFR conditions around Cook Inlet. The AFSS specialist then provided current observations along the intended route and stated, in part: "Palmer just put out a special (observation) ten minutes ago, they're calm, with ceiling 2,300 feet broken, 4,100 feet broken, 5,000 feet overcast; heading into Tahneta Pass, I actually got a Sutton report this morning, calm conditions, with 3,500 feet scattered, ceiling 7,000 feet broken, 9,000 feet overcast; no word from Sheep Mountain and it appears that Eureka automated (observation) is not reporting; nothing from Snowshoe Lake either; from Gulkana, light winds at 4 knots, with ceiling 4,900 feet broken, 6,500 feet overcast, temperature and dew point still 7 degrees (C), altimeter, 29.48 (inHg), remarks indicate intermittent light rain conditions, higher northeast..." The specialist also stated that: "...I don't have any pilot reports anywhere along the route yet this morning." The specialist then provided forecast en route weather conditions that included isolated IFR conditions around and in the vicinity of the Cook Inlet, valid until 0900; widely scattered rain showers in the Copper River basin with visibilities not expected to be any less than 5 miles. The Tahneta Pass conditions included a forecast of VFR with rain showers. The pilot concluded his briefing at 0655. At 0748, the pilot contacted the Homer Flight Service Station (FSS) and obtained an airport advisory. The pilot's last radio contact with Homer FSS was at 0754, when his flight plan was activated as he departed. Between 0930 and 1000, the airplane was observed to fly over a private airstrip located along Highway 1, about 1 mile west of Chickaloon. The airstrip is owned by a personal friend of the pilot. The airplane did not arrive in Whitehorse, and was reported overdue at 1522. The pilot's son was familiar with the planned route of flight and began an aerial search for the airplane. He located the airplane, still burning, about 2100, at an elevation of approximately 3,700 feet msl, in tundra covered terrain, on the west face of Sheep Mountain. The accident location is about 4 miles west of Sheep Mountain Lodge which is on Alaska Highway 1. Tahneta Pass, elevation about 3,000 feet msl, is located along the highway about 7 miles north-northeast of Sheep Mountain Lodge, and about 10 miles northeast of the accident site. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. A review of the pilot's FAA medical records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City, revealed correspondence from the aerospace medical certification division that contained a 6-year authorization for the special issuance of a medical certificate due to the pilot's history of sleep apnea. The expiration date of the authorization was contingent on FAA medical examinations at the frequency prescribed in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and submission of a status report from the pilot's treating physician regarding his sleep apnea at 12-month intervals. In addition, the authorization contained instructions to the pilot that permitted an aviation medical examiner to issue a medical certificate that was not valid after (date), if there were no significant adverse changes to his medical condition, and cautioned the pilot that due to his history of sleep apnea and psychiatric difficulties, operation of an aircraft was prohibited at any time new symptoms or adverse changes occur, or any time medication and/or treatment was required. The pilot applied for a third-class medical certificate from an aviation medical examiner. The pilot's FAA medical file contained correspondence from the aerospace medical certification division that informed the pilot he was eligible for a time-corrected, third-class medical certificate. The letter to the pilot indicated that the certificate superseded any previous issued certificates, and referred the pilot to the special issuance letter. No personal flight records were located for the pilot. On the pilot's application for medical certificate, the pilot indicated that his total aeronautical experience consisted of about 1,440 hours, of which 50 were accrued in the previous 6 months. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION No maintenance records for the airplane were located. The pilot's son reported that records were carried in the airplane. He estimated the airplane had accumulated approximately 425 hours. Review of archived maintenance information from a maintenance facility in Anchorage, Alaska, revealed that the most recent annual inspection showed the airplane had accrued 300.1 hours on the recording tachometer, and 321 hours on the hobbs meter. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The FAA provided weather data that was certified as a true copy of the original data used by the flight service station specialist to brief the pilot about the weather conditions along the planned route. The area forecast, issued at 0545 stated, in part: Cook Inlet and Susitna Valley, valid until 1800, clouds and weather, 4,000 feet scattered, 10,000 feet scattered to thin broken, separate layers above, tops at 22,000 feet, occasionally 4,000 feet broken. Widely scattered light rain showers. Until 0900, valley areas and near Cook Inlet, isolated ceilings below 1,000 feet; visibility, below 3 statute miles in mist. Outlook, valid from 1800 to 1200 on September 3, VFR in rain showers... Freezing level, 7,000 feet. The area forecast for the Copper River basin, stated, in part: Valid until 1800, clouds and weather, 6,000 feet scattered, 11,000 feet broken to thinly scattered, separate layers above, tops at 25,000 feet. Widely scattered broken conditions at 6,000 feet; visibility, 5 statute miles in light rain showers. Outlook, valid from 1800 to 1200 on September 3, VFR in rain showers. Tahneta Pass, VFR in rain showers... Freezing level, 7,000 feet. An amended terminal forecast for Palmer, issued at 0638 and valid from 0700 to 0400 on September 3, stated: Wind, calm; visibility, greater than 6 statue miles; clouds and sky condition, 2,300 feet scattered, 4,000 feet broken, 5,000 feet overcast. Temporary conditions from 0700 to 1100, 2,300 feet broken. From 1300, winds variable at 6 knots; visibility greater than 6 statute miles with showers in the vicinity, 7,000 feet broken. From 2100, winds variable at 6 knots; visibility greater than 6 statute miles with showers in the vicinity, 5,000 feet overcast. The local observations included Aviation Routine Weather Reports (METARs) along the planned route, and included a 0553 automated observation from Palmer, that stated: Wind, 350 degrees (true) at 3 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, 3,000 feet broken, 3,800 feet overcast; temperature 48 degrees F, dew point, 46 degrees F; altimeter, 29.56 inHg. A special automated observation at 0632 at Palmer indicated: Wind, calm; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, 2,300 feet broken, 4,100 feet broken, 5,000 feet overcast; temperature, 48 degrees F, dew point, 46 degrees F; altimeter, 29.56 inHg. A METAR at 0555 from Jonesville, Alaska, located about 2.5 nautical miles northwest of Sutton, Alaska, indicated: Wind, calm; visibility, 5 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, 3,500 feet scattered, 7,000 feet broken, 9,000 feet overcast; temperature 46 degrees F, dew point, 45 degrees F; altimeter, 29.51 inHg. The closest official weather observation station to the accident site is Sheep Mountain Lodge, Alaska, elevation 2,799 feet msl, located 4 nautical miles east of the accident. The observations are conducted at the lodge by a paid weather observer for the National Weather Service. The first weather observation from the DAWN data at Sheep Mountain was listed as 0859. The DAWN data also contained a pilot report at 0900 from Sheep Mountain that contained the following: Routine pilot report; location, over Chickaloon Pass; type aircraft, Cessna 206; remarks, westbound, unable King Mountain area, clouds to the ground, returning Gulkana, weather conditions of rain. During the course of the accident investigation, the NTSB IIC conducted a search for weather data on the internet, and obtained a copy of the Sheep Mountain weather observations that began at 0659 with subsequent observations at 0755, 0859, and 1005, and continued until the end of the day. The first Sheep Mountain METAR observation of the day, obtained from the internet, was made at 0659, and was reported as: Wind, 220 degrees (true) at 4 knots; visibility, 1/2 statute mile in mist; clouds and sky condition, indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 300 feet; temperature, 43 degrees F; dew point, 41 degrees F; altimeter, 29.45 inHg; remarks, estimated, [Tahneta] pass closed. The next Sheep Mountain METAR, obtained from the internet, was reported as: Wind, 250 degrees (true) at 8 knots; visibility, 1 statute mile in mist; clouds and sky condition, indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 300 feet; temperature, 43 degrees F; dew point, 41 degrees F; altimeter, 29.51 inHg; remarks, estimated, pass closed. At 0859, the Sheep Mountain METAR, obtained from the internet and from the FAA, was reported as: Wind, 250 degrees (true) at 8 knots; visibility, 1/2 statute mile in mist; clouds and sky condition, indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 300 feet; temperature, 45 degrees F; dew point, 43 degrees F; altimeter, 29.52 inHg; remarks, estimated, pass closed. At 1005, the Sheep Mountain METAR was reported as: Wind, 220 degrees (true) at 8 knots; visibility, 1 statute mile; clouds and sky condition, indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 300 feet; temperature, 45 degrees F; dew point, 43 degrees F; altimeter, 29.53 inHg; remarks, estimated, pass closed. At 1408, the Sheep Mountain METAR included the first report of improved visibility of 3 statute miles in mist and the pass was estimated as marginal. These conditions persisted to the end of the day. COMMUNICATIONS There were no reports of communications between the pilot and any FAA facility after the pilot departed from Homer. The pilot did not request any weather updates when he departed Homer, and no en route requests for additional weather information were made. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The NTSB IIC examined the airplane wreckage at the accident site after the wreckage was recovered. At the scene of the crash, the airplane was observed along the side of a small gully, with the nose of the airplane oriented on a magnetic heading of 310 degrees. A ground scar in the form of a disruption of the soil, from the first observed point of ground contact to the wreckage point of rest, was about 6 feet long. The airplane was resting upright on the south-facing slope of a tundra covered, easterly-oriented gully. The side of the gully was sloped about 40 degrees. All of the airplane's major components were found at the main wreckage area. The right wing was positioned upslope and the left wing downslope. The entire cockpit and cabin, the engine compartment, and the majority of the right wing, were consumed by an extensive fire. Burned vegetation around the wreckage was confined to the immediate area of the fuselage and the upsloping side of the gully, along the right wing. The wings remained in their normal position in relation to the fuselage, but the left wing was displaced slightly forward of its normal orientation. The upper wing attach points were consumed by fire. Each wing was consumed by fire from its inboard attach point to about mid span. The wing lift struts remained attached to their wing attach points, but each lower attach point was fire damaged. The wings and fuselage had extensive upward crushing of the underside of their structure, with almost no leading edge damage to either wing. Each wing flap and aileron remained attached to its respective attach points, but the inboard half of each wing flap was consumed by fire. The flaps appeared to be retracted. The outboard, trailing end of the left wing and left aileron had a slight upward curl. Each wing aileron and flap control cables was attached to its respective attach points. The empennage aft of the cargo area was not fire damaged. The outboard end of the right horizontal stabilizer had a slight upward bend. The leading edges of the horizontal stabilizers were undamaged. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were undamaged. The post-crash fire incinerated most of the cabin/cockpit area, with the upper crown and sides of the cabin/cockpit burned to the floor. Due to the post-impact fire damage, the flight controls could not be moved by their respective control mechanisms. The continuity of the flight control cables was established to the cabin/cockpit area. The main landing gear were folded aft and upward against the bottom of the fuselage. The separated nose gear strut and wheel was located near the left wingtip. Fire consumed the instrument panel, and extensively damaged the engine area. The lower portion of the engine was embedded in dirt and tundra. The engine sustained impact damage to the underside and front portion of the engine, and fire damage to rest of the engine. Two of the propeller blades were loose in the hub. One propeller blade was bent aft about 90 degrees about mid span, and had extensive chordwise scratching, "S" bending, torsional twisting, leading edge gouging and curling, and destruction of the tip. The second blade was embedded in the tundra on the right side of the engine. It had "S" bending, torsional twisting, and curling and destruction of the tip. The third blade was broken out of the propeller hub, positioned under the engine. Following recovery, an examination of the engine revealed that the propeller assembly remained connected to the engine crankshaft. The crankshaft could be rotated by the propeller. Gear train continuity was established when the crankshaft was rotated by hand. The exhaust tubes were crushed and folded, producing sharp creases that were not cracked or broken along the crease. The throttle, mixture and propeller control cables were attached to their respective components. The turbocharger compressor vanes could be turned by hand. The magnetos sustained extensive fire damage. Examination of the top massive center electrode sparks plugs revealed that each was dry and had no evidence of lead deposits. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The FAA utilizes a network of weather observations from a variety of geographical locations, most of which, but not all, are located at airports. Weather observations are conducted by automated sensors both with and without any human augmentation, additions, or remarks, or solely by human observations. These observations are linked to the FAA's DAWN system, and are used by FAA personnel to provide weather briefings to pilots. The National Weather Service, under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, also has a network of weather observations. Some, but not all of their observations, are used by the FAA. According to FAA personnel at the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) Anchorage, the paid weather observer at Sheep Mountain provides observations to the FAA by one of two methods. A computer, provided by the FAA, sends the weather data via phone line, to the FAA's Weather Message Switching Center Replacement (WMSCR) hub, located in the Continental U.S. The data, combined with other sources of weather information, is then routed to the FAA's DAWN system. The data is then accessible to the flight service stations. This sequence should take between 3 to 5 minutes. If the observer does not have a computer, the weather observations should be called via phone line, to the Kenai AFSS. The information would either be left on a recorder, or provided directly to a flight service station specialist. Neither ARTCC personnel, nor the paid weather observer at Sheep Mountain, could be certain how the weather observations for the accident date were entered into the FAA's DAWN system. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions, and subsequent collision with mountainous terrain while maneuvering. Factors contributing to the accident were weather conditions consisting of clouds/mist and low ceilings, and the pilot's failure to obtain in-flight weather advisories before entering mountainous terrain.Aircraft: CESSNA 207 Where: Aniak, AK Injuries: 1 Uninjured Phase of Flight: Forced Landing About 1330 Alaska standard time, a Cessna 207 airplane sustained substantial damage when it lost engine power and collided with trees during a forced landing, about 16 miles northwest of Aniak, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR), cross-country maintenance test flight from St. Mary's, Alaska, to Aniak, when the accident occurred. The commercial certificated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), the director of operations for the operator reported that the airplane's engine was recently installed by company maintenance personnel after it was overhauled. The engine was overhauled by a maintenance facility in Anchorage, and the pilot was putting flight hours on the engine. The director of operations said the pilot noticed a change in the engine oil pressure, and the engine began to lose power. The pilot made a forced landing in remote terrain. During the emergency landing, the airplane collided with trees and received damage to the right main landing gear, the nose gear, and the fuselage. In the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report submitted by the pilot, the pilot reported that during the flight, the engine oil pressure was indicating about 50 psi. He made a slight change in the engine rpm and manifold pressure settings, and the oil pressure rose rapidly to the top of the operating range. The engine cylinder and oil temperature readings did not change. The pilot climbed the airplane to about 2,800 feet msl, and discussed the engine parameters with other company personnel via radio. As the airplane was approaching Aniak, the pilot said the engine lost power. He switched the fuel selector from the left tank to the right tank and activated the engine boost pump. Engine power was not restored, and he switched the selector back to the left tank. The pilot indicated the engine sounded as if it was firing on all cylinders, but only at an idle. The pilot also indicated that, "I do not know whether the left fuel tank was completely exhausted of fuel or not. The engine went from power to idle immediately, without any sputtering or coughing." A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office traveled to the accident scene and examined the accident airplane. He reported that the left fuel tank was empty. The right fuel tank contained about 15 gallons of fuel. He found no evidence of fuel leaking, and the engine and propeller controls were properly attached. The inspector started the engine, but due to broken engine mounts, the engine was not operated above an idle, however throttle movement was applied enough to elicit an increase in rpm. The FAA inspector also reported that the operator sent the engine to a maintenance facility in Anchorage where it was installed and operated on an engine test stand. On April 16, the engine was operated on the stand at full power.
THE CAUSE The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's improper fuel management, and subsequent fuel starvation during cruise flight. A factor contributing to the accident was unsuitable terrain for a forced landing. Source: National Transportation BoardAircraft: Cessna 208B Where: Toksook Bay, AK Injuries: None Phase of Flight:
Take off On February 10, 2004, about 1652 Alaska standard time, a wheel-equipped Cessna 208B departed the runway and nosed over during the takeoff roll at the Toksook Bay Airport, Toksook Bay, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled passenger flight to Newtok, Alaska, under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. The commercial certificated pilot, and the 6 passengers, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on February 12, the director of operations for the operator reported that the pilot was departing on runway 34. The runway surface had areas of packed snow and ice, and the director of operations indicated that he had received reports that a right crosswind was blowing from 070 degrees between 15 to 25 knots. According to the director of operations, the pilot said that about 300 feet after beginning the takeoff roll, between 30 to 50 knots airspeed, the airplane began to drift to the left, which he was unable to correct. The airplane departed off the left side of the runway and nosed over. The airplane received damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. Runway 34 at Toksook Bay is 3,200 feet long and 60 feet wide. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's inadequate planning and decision to initiate a takeoff into a crosswind that exceeded the airplane's demonstrated crosswind component, which resulted in a loss of directional control during the takeoff roll, and subsequent collision with terrain and nose over. Factors contributing to the accident were the crosswind, an icy runway, and the pilot's failure to abort the takeoff.Aircraft:
Cessna 208B Where: Auburn, AL Injuries: None Phase of Flight: Take off On February 3, 2004, at 1400 central standard time, a Cessna 208B, lost right rudder control shortly after takeoff from the Columbus Metro Airport in Columbus, Georgia. The repositioning flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91, and visual flight rules. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot and co-pilot were not injured, and the airplane was not damaged. The flight departed the Columbus Metro Airport, in Columbus, Georgia on February 3, 2004 at 1340, enroute to Auburn-Opelika Airport in Auburn, Alabama. According to the flight crew, during the takeoff roll the co-pilot noticed that the right rudder was not responding. Due to the high traffic volume at Columbus, Georgia they elected to proceed to the Auburn-Opelika Airport in Auburn, Alabama. During the flight they began to diagnose the problem. They found that the rudder trim was not responding and full deflection of the right rudder pedal did not have any effect. Further examination found the right rudder cable broken. The crew contacted their Chief Pilot and Director of Maintenance, and found out that there was nothing that could be done in-flight. The pilot asked that emergency vehicles meet them on runway 36 just as a precaution. The pilot did not declare an emergency. The airplane landed uneventfully on runway 36 and the pilot performed a normal shutdown. Examination of the rudder cable found it separated at the trailing end of its attaching clevis. The cable and clevice were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington, DC for further examination. Examination of the rudder cable by the NTSB Materials Laboratory found that the wire rope portion of the cable was fractured just inside the clevis fitting at the forward end of the cable. The strands of the wire rope had separated from each other over a distance of more than 1 foot from the cable end. The individual wires in most of the strands had not separated from each other or were separated over a much shorter distance. Visual examination of the fractured wire ends with the aid of a bench binocular microscope revealed that the wire fractures were aligned with each other within about 0.02 inch, and were located about 0.05 inch inside the end of the clevis fitting. Nearly all of the fractures were on a flat transverse plane, with no apparent necking down deformation, features typical of fatigue cracking. A few of the wires were fractured on a slant plane and did contain necking down deformation, features typical of overstress fracture; and a few of the wires had fractures with a mixture of fatigue and overstress features. Further examination of the clevis fitting revealed that the forward ends of the clevis tines were pinched together. The spacing between the tines was measured with calipers and found to be 0.18 inch near where the tines joined together and 0.13 inch near the tip. Visual examination of the inside surfaces of the tines of the clevis fitting revealed the presence of a dark rust-colored discoloration, typical of fretting or rubbing damage, adjacent to the tip of the tines. The exterior surface of the clevis fitting also contained imprint or rubbing marks from contact with the underside of the attachment bolt head and from the washer under the nut. On both sides of the clevis, the damage was found dominantly on the forward and aft of the attachment bolt hole (and much less on the upper and lower sides of the hole). The damage on this side was much more severe than on the other side. According to Cessna Aircraft Company, as a result of this failure, Cessna is adding a spacer to the production process that will be placed between the rudder cable clevis and the rod end. This change will also be reflected in the Cessna Illustrated Parts Catalog.Aircraft:
Cessna 210 Where: Arizona Injuries: Two minor Phase of Flight: Takeoff A Cessna T210M veered off the runway and overturned during departure from Cliff Dwellers Lodge airstrip near Marble Canyon, Arizona. The private pilot and one passenger sustained minor injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The pilot stated that he landed at Cliff Dwellers Lodge in anticipation of launching on a rafting trip. Lodge personnel informed him that his party would be leaving from nearby Marble Canyon. He did not shut the airplane down and taxied back for takeoff on runway 22. He stated runway 22 was a 40-foot-wide dirt runway that was 3,820 feet long and the airport elevation was 4,217 feet. He used 20 degrees of flaps and said the wind was calm. He thought the runway was rough and jostled the airplane more than he was used to. The pilot stated the airplane lifted off in ground effect and veered to the left. Then the left wing and landing gear dropped, and the airplane touched down off the runway in soft dirt. The landing gear sheared off, both wings contacted the ground, and the airplane overturned. A witness stated that the pilot departed from midfield and the runway sloped uphill in the direction of departure. A routine aviation weather report (METAR) for Page, Arizona, 20 miles away on a bearing of 040 degrees, reported that the temperature was about 82 degrees at the time of the accident. The Safety Board investigator computed an approximate density altitude of 6,800 feet. The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) states that a minimum ground run takeoff can be accomplished using 20 degrees of flaps and leaving the ground in a slightly tail-low attitude. However, it directs the pilot to immediately level off and accelerate to a safe climb speed. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: The pilot's failure to use all available runway and his failure to follow the prescribed short field takeoff procedure resulting in a loss of control during the takeoff roll. Factors were the short, rough, and rising runway, and the soft dirt surrounding the runway. Source: National Transportation Board Aircraft: Cessna 210L Where: Great Falls, MT Injuries: None Phase of Flight: In Flight Approximately 1110 mountain standard time, a Cessna 210L impacted trees while the pilot was trying to execute a low-altitude course reversal in mountainous terrain about 40 miles southeast of Great Falls, Montana. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, which departed Great Falls in visual meteorological conditions about 25 minutes before the accident, entered an area of instrument meteorological conditions while en route to Cheyenne, Wyoming. No flight plan had been filed. The ELT was not set off by the impact, but was later activated by the pilot. According to the pilot, while heading toward Cheyenne, lowering clouds, snow, and rising terrain made him stray from the route that he had planned. As he tried to maneuver through the mountainous terrain, he was initially able to stay below the clouds and clear of the ground. Eventually, he entered an area where his attempts to maintain clearance from the terrain resulted in the aircraft entering the bottom of the cloud layer. Because he was having trouble maintaining visual contact with the ground through the clouds and snow, he attempted to reverse his course, but clipped a tree during the turn. He immediately rolled the aircraft wings-level, and tried to maintain control as it collided with other trees and fell to the snow covered terrain. After the aircraft came to a stop, and the pilot assured himself there was not going to be a fire, he activated the ELT. Around 0700 on the morning of the accident, the pilot called Great Falls Autom |